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Abstract
Disruptive technologies arrive with regularity.  Whether it  is  the first  industrial  revolution with steam
powered  factories  and  transportation,  or  subsequent  revolutions  which  brought  about  chemical
engineering,  communications revolutions,  aviation and eventually  biotechnology and digitisation.  We
stand at the edge of the next revolution the AI revolution where methods of artificial intelligence and
machine learning  offer  possibilities  hitherto  unimagined.  How this  revolution develops  and how our
society  absorbs  the  potential  of  this  new  technology  will  be  largely  determined  by  the  models  of
regulation and governance applied to the nascent technology. In this paper the authors examine lessons
from history and propose a framework for  identifying and analysing the key elements of  regulatory
regimes and their interactions which can form the basis for developing a new model for AI regulatory
systems. Furthermore, it argues that the goals of such systems should be to manage the risks different
models and uses of AI pose, not just the ethical issues they create.
Keywords : Regulation, Artificial Intelligence, Regulatory Models, History of Techno-Regulation, Decentred
Regulation, Polycentric Regulation
Introduction
Successive periods of industrial revolution have been enabled by the creation of new technologies, and
with that new risks, new concentrations of power and new coordination challenges. In each phase, states
have, to varying degrees and in varying ways, sought to manage those risks and challenges through forms
of  regulation.  The  transition  to  new  manufacturing  and  engineering  processes  in  the  18 th and
19th century prompted the rise of occupational health and safety regulation for example. The second
industrial revolution in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was characterised by the new technologies
of energy production, chemical processes, engineering and methods of communication. In each area,
successive waves of regulation were introduced to manage risks and facilitate coordination, for example
of transport, of the airwaves, and of airspace. The third industrial revolution was marked by the creation
of,  amongst  other  things,  nuclear  energy,  electronics  and  computing,  information  technology,
biotechnologies,  and  the  plethora  of  technologies  driven  by  the  space  race.  By  the  early  1990s,
sociologists  Beck  and  Giddens  were  arguing  that  we  were  seeing  the  advent  of  a  'risk  society',
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preoccupied with the risks to health, safety and in particular the environment posed by the proliferation
of these new technologies. [1] Regulation turned in part to managing these new risks, which also were
starting to prompt significant ethical debates, for example on what limits should be imposed on the
development and deployment of technologies of genetic engineering of humans, animals and plants.
However,  this  was  also  the  period  when  economic  theories  of  neo-liberalism  and  the  concomitant
political  philosophy  of  the  limited  state  came  into  full  force,  restricting  the  legitimacy  of  state
intervention into markets to being only that which was necessary to make markets function efficiently; an
edict which can be in tension with the risk society thesis. The fourth industrial revolution is upon us now,
characterised not just by increased digitisation but by technological innovation which cuts across the
spheres of the biological, the physical and the digital.  Each period builds on its predecessor, creating
incredible opportunities but bringing its own risks, and each occurs in a shifting political context in which
contesting political views of the legitimate role of the state shapes arguments as to what the role and
purpose of regulation should be.
This sweep through history is necessarily partial and incomplete, but illustrates some of the historical
regulatory context to current debates on the regulation of AI and machine learning (ML), and the related
issues of the regulation of their raw material: data collection and use. The first and second parts of this
paper  outlines the varying  state-based regulatory responses  to  disruptive technologies  over the last
hundred years or so, highlighting the different rationales for and modes of regulatory intervention and
the contested political philosophies which underpin arguments about the appropriate role for states or
firms in regulation. The third draws out some of the parallels which can be seen between early debates
on  the  regulation  of  the  internet  and  contemporary  debates  on  the  regulation  of  AI  and  machine
learning. The fourth part argues that if we are to make progress in developing effective and accountable
systems of regulation, we need first to stand back from the particularities of these debates to analysing
regulatory systems as a whole. Building out from the decentred or polycentric analysis, in its final part we
provide a framework for designing regulatory systems, for analysing deep rooted causes of failures, for
thinking  through  the  potential  impacts  of  changes  in  any  part  of  the  system,  and  for  helping  us
understand how each element would need to operate and be accountable if regulation of AI is to be both
effective and trusted.
1. Regulation and Technology - an historical perspective
An important message that regulators of AI must learn from prior disruptive (and disrupting) technologies
is  that  technological  development  and the disruption that  it  brings  occur  in  the vanguard of  socio-
economic and socio-legal change. This has been seen repeatedly: from the introduction of the railway
and later the motor vehicle to the development of the telephone system in the 19th century, through
aviation,  commercial  radio,  broadcast  and  film  media,  and  the  development  of  the  internet  in  the
20th century.
Looking at the historical record we have identified and modelled six key stages that disruptive technology
normally passes through from its concept to it becoming a regulated product or service. There are three
initial stages: (1) proof of theoretical concept; (2) development of a prototype; and (3) development of a
commercial  manufacturing  and  distribution system.  These initial  stages  are  followed by  one  of  two
further  stage  pathways.  For  technologies  that  need  to  make  use  of  centralised,  scarce,  or  public
resources,  or which pose systemic  risks  or risks of  'deep regret',  such as  to life,  a prior  licensing or
approval stage is usually required, so stage (4) is licensing or approval for development; (5) is commercial
marketing and exploitation; and (6) is reactive regulation and control. For technologies which do not use
centralised or public resources or it is judged that risks are diffused, or can be managed by individual
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consumers or through remediation, the fourth stage may be avoided and direct movement from stage (3)
commercial development to stage (5) commercial exploitation may take place:
Figure 1: Disruptive technologies - stages of development
Recognition of which form the disruptive technology takes is important for regulators as it determines
whether ex ante or ex post exploitation (stage 5) regulation is possible (and appropriate). Historically
factors such as access to, and use of, a shared public resource allowed for ante-exploitation (stage 4)
regulation. If we look for example at the history of motor vehicle regulation, we see that while the first
motor  vehicles  (in  the  modern  sense)  were  developed  in  the  1880s,  legal  regulation  of  "horseless
carriages" predates this considerably, with the Locomotives on Highways Act 1861 being the UK's oldest
legal  provision  on  the  regulation  of  powered  road  vehicles.  The  early  regulation  of  this  nascent
technology was possible as the technology was to be found on the public highway; a space shared with
other users including horse riders, operators of carriages and carts, and pedestrians. The need to regulate
this shared space predated the disruptive innovation of the powered motor vehicle which meant that
although a disruptive technology it was also quickly a regulated technology. [2] When we look to other
disruptive technologies of the late 19th and early 20th centuries we find that the need to use public, or
scarce, resources, often meant early (stage 4) intervention into the nascent commercial market for the
technology.  We find,  for  example,  early  government  regulation  of  radio  communications.  Originally
demonstrated by Guglielmo Marconi in 1896, radio communications were quickly regulated, with the
International Radiotelegraph Conference taking place in Berlin in 1906, and with the US Congress noting
in 1910 that regulation was necessary as "the physical limitation on the airwaves or electromagnetic
spectrum restricts the number of stations." [3]
These early interventions into areas with scarce and shared public resources can be contrasted with the
development of telecommunications regulation and (a lack of) intervention into the market for the home
telephone system. Here there was no early (stage 4) intervention. The (semi) modern analogue telephone
was developed in the 1870s by a number of inventors but usually attributed to Alexander Graham Bell
who patented the telephone in 1876. With Bell holding a monopoly (in the US market) take up was slow
until 1894 when the technology entered the public domain. During the 18 years of Bell's monopoly the
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average number of daily calls per 1,000 population grew relatively slowly, from 4 to 37.  [4] Once Bell's
legal monopoly was removed uptake grew quickly: thousands of competitors began connecting users,
increasing the daily calling average per 1,000 people from 37 in 1895 to 391 in 1910.  [5] It was only in
1910 (at the same point that Congress first regulated the much newer technology of radio) that legal
regulation entered into the market through the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, a now discredited attempt to
regulate the market to create natural  monopolies and the direct cause of the AT&T monopoly.  [6] In
contradistinction to radio therefore, where there was a limited supply of spectrum and as a result a stage
4 intervention, with telephone as copper wires were theoretically limitless (as long as someone paid for
their construction and installation) regulation came much later as a stage 6 intervention.
What can be learned from this? We can see that the interaction of regulation with the development and
deployment cycle of disruptive technology can follow the two paths identified above. Either: (1) proof; (2)
prototype; (3) commercial development (4) approval; (5) commercial exploitation; and (6) regulation and
control OR (1) proof; (2) prototype; (3) commercial development (4) commercial exploitation; and (5)
regulation and control.
The distinction historically between the two forms of intervention in the context of telecommunication
technologies was one based on resourcing and scarcity not, for example, on the nature of risks posed to
health  or  life.  More  recently  however  the  model  has  changed  slightly.  Moves  towards  market
deregulation in the 1980s has seen public regulators less likely to get involved in approval or licensing
where  the  issue  is  a  market  or  scarcity  one.  Regulators  tend  now  only  to  intervene  prior  to
commercialisation in areas of public safety or security in order to manage risks; so prior approval for
pharmaceutical  products  and  medical  devices  is  a  vital  part  of  their  commercial  development  and
deployment cycle. Interestingly development of autonomous vehicles (AVs) seems to be following the
approval model. No state is permitting the unregulated testing of autonomous vehicles on public roads.
The  United  Kingdom,  one  of  the  leaders  in  AV  testing,  has  created  a  rigorous  regulatory  regime
controlling the use of AV on public roads. [7] This is likely the result more of public safety concerns rather
than the fact that public highways are a common resource. There have been a wide variety of vehicles
licensed to use public highways in recent years, always at the point that safety concerns are met: thus,
the primary reason for intervention at stage 4 today is safety not concerns over markets or resourcing.
2. Regulation and Technology Redux: Internet Regulation (and
Failure)
The default approach of states today is not to interfere in nascent (likely disruptive) technologies but
rather to let the market regulate unless there are public safety or security concerns. The model for late
20th century  disruptive  innovation  and  regulation  is  probably  internet  regulation  and
governance. [8] While the internet is parasitical upon commercial telecommunications networks (and so
applying the early 20th century model seen in radio communications we may have expected it to be
regulated) moves were made to deregulate telecommunications markets to ensure data carriage via local
loop unbundling and shared access (rights of carriage) for commercial broadband providers. [9] Carriage
requirements, partnered with the placing of network protocols such as TCP/IP into open source and the
release of the WWW software protocols by CERN in 1993 created an marketplace not subject to prior
approval despite the relative scarcity of network capacity at the time: the theory it appears was the
market  would regulate the nascent uses of  this  exciting new technology.  Coordination on standards,
domain names, and other key features of the internet was, and is, provided by non-state bodies, such as
the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), Internet Engineering Taskforce (IETF) and Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICAAN).
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However, the truth was the market was never quite as free as free market theorists imagined and the
technology  was  never  quite  as  regulated as  utility  regulators  may  have  liked.  We tend  to  map the
regulation of the internet through clearly defined phases that in many respects are quite similar to those
seen in the development of telecommunications regulation about a century before.
The first phase may be defined as the market regulation phase. It was marked by a strong libertarian
ethos and the belief that only cybernauts or netizens (to use the language of the time) could set the
limits of their own freedoms in this new space. This early cyber-libertarian movement attracted a number
of prominent supporters including most famously John Perry Barlow. Cyber-libertarians were identifiable
by their adherence to the belief that the incorporeal and borderless nature of the digital environment
would render traditional law-makers powerless, and would empower the community within cyberspace
to elect its own law-makers and to design its own laws tailored to that environment. The high point, in
the  public  conscience,  of  this  argument  was  Barlow's Declaration  of  Independence  for
Cyberspace. [10] Here he set  out  the cyberlibertarian argument that  traditional  governments had no
moral  authority  in  cyberspace  as  it  was  a  space  separate  from  the  traditional  post-Westphalian
jurisdictions recognised in international law. In essence the argument may be boiled down to a simple
claim that cyberspace was a space separate from analogous real-world spaces such as international air
routes, the high seas, or even outer space, in that it could not be physically represented and existed only
as  a  space  made  of  protocols  and  data.  Traditional  sovereign  governments  could,  according  to
cyberlibertarians,  not  exert  any  moral  authority  as  the  action  of  any  state  to  control  any  part  of
cyberspace would have impact throughout the space beyond the sovereign limits of any government (or
governments if acting in concert).
The legal framework to this argument was of course famously supplied in David Johnson and David Post's
seminal  1996 paper Law and Borders. [11] There they argued that no state has authority to regulate
activities  which  occur  in  cyberspace  for  four,  interconnected  reasons.  Firstly,  that  lawmaking  is  the
exercise of power over those persons whom the state can control. By asserting a claim to apply national
law, the state in question is also asserting a right to control the cyberspace activities of individuals who
reside in other states, and this conflicts with those other states' monopoly rights to exercise power over
their citizens. Secondly, that while they recognise that some overlap in power claims is legitimate, via the
effects test of private international  law which is  accepted and adopted by all  states,  the effects test
should not apply at all to activities in cyberspace. This is because those activities have no greater effect in
any one state than in the remainder of the world, and so no state can legitimately claim to apply national
law in preference to any other national law merely on the ground of effects. Thirdly, the legitimacy of a
state's law-making power derives from the consent of the governed and their participation in the law-
making process. Claiming to apply national laws to cyberspace activities goes beyond the boundaries of
that legitimacy because it extends the ambit of those laws to persons who have not so consented and
who have no way to participate in the lawmaking process, for example through elected representatives.
Finally, a lack of borders means that cyberspace users do not receive the notice to which they are entitled
that their activities are now subject to a particular state's laws. The rule of law, they argued, requires
notice of a law's claim to authority over one's actions. [12]
This may be seen as a unique claim, about a unique technology. Prior technologies did not allow for a
creation of a  space outside real  space.  It  was clear that in areas of  shared responsibility such as  in
aviation, shipping, or even in space law nation states shared both control and responsibility. This was
necessary due to both the limited availability  of  resources (shipping lanes, aviation corridors,  orbital
paths) and to mitigate risks to both persons and assets. Cyberspace was, to cyberlibertarians, different as
there were in theory an unlimited resource in bits, and in practice little risk to persons or (replicable)
digital assets.
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Of  course,  in  truth  little  of  the  Cyberlibertarian  argument  was  true.  Resources,  in  the  form  or
telecommunications bandwidth were scarce, while risks of harm were real in multiple forms from simple
copyright infringement or abuse of personal data, through online fraud to online abuse, hate, and threats
of  violence (including death threats).  This  truth formed the foundation of  the opposing cyber-realist
movement  spearheaded  by  the  likes  of  Cass  Sunstein,  Lawrence  Lessig  and  Jack  Goldsmith.  This
movement examined the nexus between the real world and the digital.  Much like maritime law they
recognised the effectiveness of regulation at the margins. Rather than focusing on port authorities they
focused on the access points of the internet and the code of the space itself. Henry Perritt pointed out
that Town Hall Democracy, as proposed by the Cyberlibertarians, could not function in such a large and
varied space as there was no form of self-governing community in the space. Instead, he pointed out that
contractualism and control  by the bodies that provide access would be the default  for of regulation
unless states intervened to protect individuals: [13] a point made forcefully by Lawrence Lessig in his
book Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace . [14]
With  the  1990s  debate  fractured  between  the  market  regulation  position  of  libertarians  and  the
contractualism and code position championed by digital realists such as Lessig, Jack Goldsmith, [15] and
Tim Wu, [16] the academic debate began to centre on more practical questions of modelling effective
regulation. In essence if the digital realists were right, how could effective regulation be modelled for a
place which, as the libertarians had pointed out, had no clear borders and no government? Some such as
Murray re-examined the role of the "citizens of cyberspace" pointing out that legitimacy is still drawn
from  the  governed  and  as  such  a  model  of  "symbiotic  regulation",  regulation  "which  affords  all
participants in the regulatory matrix an opportunity to shape the evolutionary development of their
environment", [17] was  to  be  preferred.  Others  like  Brown  and  Marsden  examined  the  role  of  co-
regulation, [18] while Reed returned to the concept of a governable cyber-space by re-examining the
authority and legitimacy (what he called respect-worthy) of laws in cyberspace, [19] a theme he would
return to in his recent book with Andrew Murray. [20]
While this academic debate was ongoing what happened in the wider world of law and policy was a
model  of  regulatory  weakness  and  ultimately  failure.  Governments  seemed  paralysed,  with  no
government (at least no Western government) wanting to be the first to be seen to be regulating this
innovative,  creative  space  where  freedom  seemed  to  create  both  economic  and  civic  benefits.
Governments interacted with this space in a piecemeal fashion: some laws on copyright infringement
here, [21] some on hate and harmful speech there, [22] but no coherent strategy for regulation of the
space emerged.  By around 2010, and the emergence of the currently dominant model of regulatory
thought for the online environment -  intermediary or platform responsibility/liability, [23] it  was clear
that as predicted by proponents of digital realism, effective regulation of the online environment had
been ceded through contractualism to a small  number of  key online platforms:  platforms which act
within their own spheres as private nation states. [24] There is the state of Facebook which controls much
of our online social media experience. There is Alphabet which controls our search, and much of our
mobile experience, Apple which controls the rest of our mobile experience and much content experience,
Amazon which controls a large portion of our content experience and much of the Internet of Things, and
Microsoft which essentially sweeps up everything else. Real world states are now rushing to bring forth
legislation pell-mell to oblige these "gatekeepers" to regulate our online lives and experiences in line with
the values of the state rather than in line with the corporate values of the gatekeepers. [25]
The experience of internet regulation from 1995 to today serves as a warning which is applicable to all
emerging technologies.  By failing to take early steps to structurally regulate the internet and instead
focusing on individual harms, governments failed to appreciate that they had left markets to control a
communications  technology  which  relies  on  network  effects  and  can  create  system  wide  risks  and
impacts. As a result, we ended up in a position similar to the natural monopolies of telecommunications
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seen in the 20th century, however this time it was as a result of a failure to intervene rather than by
design for as Lawrence Lessig had made clear in 1998, East Coast codemakers had the ability to control
West Coast codemakers - they just required the will. [26]
3.  Lessons from history for  the regulation of  AI  and Machine
Learning: bringing risks back in
Today  parallels  may  be  seen  between the  internet  regulation  debate  of  the  1990s  and  the  debate
surrounding the regulation of AI and Machine Learning. Firstly, AI and ML similarly to the internet, but
distinctly from motor vehicle regulation, telecommunications regulation or radio regulation, does not
seem to raise any scarcity issues. Like bits datasets are seemingly limitless, scalable and more valuable as
their  accumulation  grows.  Secondly,  like  internet  regulation  in  the  1990s,  risks  of  harms  are  being
characterised  as  particular  or  individual  risks  rather  than  systemic  or  structural.  There  are  clearly
identified  risks  around  bias  and  the  attendant  regulatory  regime  in  the  General  Data  Protection
Regulation. [27] There is awareness of harms from data mining and profiling, [28] and discussion over
liability and risks in decision-making systems. [29] There is even discussion of copyright interests in AI
generated works [30] but this discussion, as with discussion of risks and harms of online content and
materials in the 1990s, remains piecemeal and rooted in specific harms or risks rather than the systemic
risk of AI and ML.
The wider discourse that is  taking place is  drawing us away from law, or even traditional  models of
command  and  control  or  co-regulation  and  governance,  towards  soft  self-regulation  and  codes  of
practice. This ethical model,  discussed further below, has seen the adoption of codes of practice for
general AI [31] and for data-driven health and care technology, [32] among others. However, as we shall
discuss, ethical standards for such systemic risks are insufficient, particularly in so far as they assume that
risks are individualised and that the key to their management is the choices an individual consumer
makes within the market place. Based upon our experience of internet regulation and governance from
1995 to today, such an approach will lead to future regulatory failures.
If one were to predict the outcome of this based upon our experience of the internet regulation case
study, it  does not make for happy reading. There is a nascent debate on the regulation of AI with a
number of proposals, beyond ethics, put forward. The first, from Matthew Scherer, is the creation of a
state regulator who would certify AI following safety testing. [33] Variations on this theme come from
Andrew Tutt, [34] and Olivia Erdélyi and Judy Goldsmith who recommend a new international artificial
intelligence organisation which might bring binding commitments from states. [35] However as we might
predict from the internet governance debate they are being met by a number of arguments. Firstly, there
is AI Libertarianism: (1) the market will regulate; [36] (2) there is no one government or regulator who
has authority,  or  even the legitimacy to  regulate; [37] (3)  the community is  the source of  legitimate
authority to regulate. [38] Then in time there will be AI realism: (1) the market cannot control this; (2) key
players will set the agenda and should be the focus of regulation; (3) regulation should focus on discrete
risks  and  harms  rather  than  processes  or  structures.  Much  later  may  come the  realisation  that  as
governments stood by a few large corporations have stolen a march and have become self-governing
within the sphere through contractualisation. Now it may be that AI and ML will not follow the same path
as internet regulation as the risks and harms are more clearly defined than with the internet and as a
result, governments will move more quickly this time. Pessimistically though the early indicators are this
is not the case.
One clear systemic risk of AI and ML is the "black box" issue. This is the problem that arises when an
algorithmic system makes decisions which prove extremely difficult to explain in a way that the average
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person can understand. In essence while it is possible to observe incoming data (input) and outgoing data
(output) in algorithmic systems, but their internal operations are not very well understood. The problem
of the "black box" has been much discussed in academic (and wider) circles. One of the best-known
recent  discussants  from  a  regulatory  standpoint  is  Frank  Pasquale.  His  2015  book  The  Black  Box
Society [39] is, or was, most people's introduction to the problem from a regulatory standpoint.  However,
in the four years since publication there has been little development of the question of how best to
regulate black boxes. In his 2018 paper The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent and
Causation , [40] Yavar Bathaee was forced to conclude that the current legal-regulatory approach to the
black box problem, a right to receive an explanation in cases of automated decision-making, "poses an
immediate threat to intent and causation tests that appear in virtually every field of law". [41]
A further concern is  reliance on ethics and soft  governance.  In a retreat from regulation many have
proposed the answer to  AI  governance may be found in ethics. [42] This  should  be resisted on two
grounds: one empirical, one normative. The normative objection is that this trend, to produce lists of
desiderata of good behaviour, causes the law, including regulation, to be marginalised in the debate in
favour of a focus on these soft forms of governance. This "ethics washing" leads to significant problems.
Where companies have a voluntary, ethical commitment in tension with a legal, commercial duty, it is not
difficult to see why compliance with the legal duty wins out. Furthermore, the data and AI profession
lacks  key  characteristics  of  professions  in  which  a  soft  governance  approach  works  -  there  are  no
longstanding  norms  of  good  behaviour,  no  well-established  methods  for  translating  principles  into
practice, and no licensing body. The empirical objection may be found in the now defunct, and similar,
debate around internet and data ethics in the 1980s and 1990s. Then as now there were arguments over
whether ethics were to be preferred to stricter forms of governance. Indeed, if one reads James Moor's
classic 1985 paper, What Is Computer Ethics? clear parallels with the current debate on AI ethics emerge
as Moor observes the ethical risks: "Computers are logically malleable in that they can be shaped and
molded to do any activity that can be characterized in terms of inputs, outputs and connecting logical
operations ...  .  Because logic  applies  everywhere,  the potential  applications of  computer technology
appear limitless. The computer is the nearest thing we have to a universal tool. Indeed, the limits of
computers are largely the limits of our own creativity." [43]
This ethical debate remained vibrant through the 1980s and 1990s but generally died out in the early
2000s as it became clear that regulation and governance was required and ethics were too soft to control
a sphere of increasing sophistication and commercial value. Again, if we assume the we are roughly at
1991/92 on the internet regulation timeline the discussion of ethics is to be expected. Our experience
though is that the lure of soft regulation through ethical codes of practice were a crutch for governments
who did not want to set hard standards.  Eventually though with contractualised regulation replacing
ethics the folly of that error would become apparent.
4. The Regulation We Need
The debates on regulation of the internet and now of AI and ML swirl around issues of authority and
legitimacy  of  different  types  of  bodies  or  groups  to  regulate;  the  efficacy  of  different  types  of
intervention,  such  as  licensing,  code,  contracts,  governmental  rules;  organisational  structures,  in
particular  the  territorial  mismatch  of  national  governments  and  transnational  operators;  conflicts
between systems, such as ethics and legal duties; motivations of different actors: corporates, legislatures,
governments;  and  whose  normative  values  should  dominate:  those  of  individuals  making  individual
choices, or those of the 'market', in practice the dominant platform providers, or those of the state - but
which state?
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Debates also tend to be focused on the technology and its associated actors; it is relatively rare to draw
on analyses of regulatory systems in other domains, or to abstract back even further to consider what a
regulatory  system  consists  of.  It  should  be  remembered  that  'regulation'  or  indeed  'regulatory
governance' are terms which carry a range of connotations in both public and academic debate.
So  some  preliminary  definitional  work  is  required  to  avoid  misunderstandings. [44] First,  the  terms
''state'' and ''non-state'' are used throughout this section to distinguish in broad terms those regulators
which have a legal mandate and those which do not - while recognizing that in practice the two are
interrelated in a myriad of different types of relationship, and indeed state actors may be regulated by
non-state  actors.  A  hierarchy  of  state-non-state  cannot  be  assumed.  By  regulation  (and  regulatory
governance) is meant sustained and focused attempts to change the behaviour of others in order to
address  a  collective  problem or  attain  an identified end  or  ends,  usually  but  not  always  through a
combination of rules or norms and some means for their implementation and enforcement, which can be
legal  or non-legal. [45] The regulatory functions can be exercised primarily by one actor or dispersed
between a number of actors within a system. The greater the dispersal and fragmentation of actors in the
performance of regulation, including the definition of the problem/goals, the greater the polycentricity of
the  regime.  A  regulatory  regime,  system or  network  is  a  set  of  interrelated  actors  who  are  jointly
attempting to address a particular set of problems to achieve a set of goals, its boundaries are defined by
the definition of the problem being addressed, and it has some continuity over time.
The  arguments  developed  here  draw  on  the  decentering  or  polycentric  analysis  of  regulatory
systems. [46] At its conceptual core are five central notions: complexity, both conceptually and in terms
of the actors and organisations involved; the fragmentation of power, capacities and responsibilities; the
inevitable interdependencies between all actors within the system or network, not least regulators and
regulatees; the inherent ungovernability of actors due to their ability to exercise agency and choice; and
the rejection of a clear distinction between public and private in the performance of regulation. The
decentred analysis thus draws attention away from individual regulatory bodies, be they at the national
or global level, and emphasizes instead the multitude of actors which constitute a regulatory regime or
regulatory network in a particular domain, and the interactions within and between them. [47] Moreover,
it emphasises that regulatory strategies can be hybrid - combining governmental, private and other non-
governmental actors, multifaceted - using a number of different strategies simultaneously or sequentially,
and  often  indirect  -  including  using  the  positional  power  of  intermediaries  or  gatekeepers  such  as
insurers, auditors, advisors and others. In the context of accountability, this aspect of the decentering
analysis requires recognition of the multiple points of accountability within a regulatory regime and of
the form that accountability mechanisms may have to take to be effective.
Once we understand regulation or regulatory governance conceptually as a complex, polycentric system
composed of several elements, we can quickly see that in practice, regulation is usually complex, messy
and highly imperfect;  that addressing difficult  problems involves complicated interactions of multiple
people and organisations with conflicting, or at least differing, interests, understandings and values; and
often requires the creation, adaptation and implementation of myriads of techniques which may or may
not cut across one another. As such, it is not surprising that regulation often fails. What is surprising is
that it ever succeeds at all.
So how can we stand back to analyse a regulatory system, and indeed to create a framework which can
help us to design a system whilst also thinking about how different configurations of a system might work
in practice?
Building out from the decentred or polycentric analysis, we should think of regulation as a particular form
of social system with six key elements, all of which constantly interact to produce a dynamic system. [48]
European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol 10, Issue 3, 2019                          
Figure 2: Regulatory systems - an analytical framework
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A logical starting point in theory, though not necessarily in practice, is with goals and values - what is the
regulatory system trying to achieve, and which values is it  trying to uphold? The standard economic
justification for regulation prevalent since the 1980s is that regulation is there to correct market failures.
But as we have seen, regulation has always been about more than that, or indeed not about that at all: as
the  histories  above  illustrate,  it  has  been  focused  on  coordination  or  the  management  of  scarce
resources, and / or managing risks. Regulation can also be aimed at controlling power; and/or introduced
to uphold fundamental  values of a particular group such as,  in some societies at  least,  principles of
equality, non-discrimination, the rule of law and the administration of justice, and very prominently in
current debates, privacy.
Identifying what it is that a regulatory system is meant to be achieving can be harder than it seems, as
goals and values are often poorly articulated, or inchoate, or simply conflicting, as current debates are
demonstrating. It may be possible to get agreement on some of the more technical desiderata of AI and
ML,  such as the agreement on technical  standards to enable coordination or inter-operability,  or  on
scientific assessments of the scientific quality and robustness of different algorithms and their reliability
and appropriateness to the different tasks they are being used to perform, though even here assessments
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can be scientifically contested [49] even before we enter into the discussions on social interpretations of
science. And different groups (both within and between countries) will  and do differ on clearly value
laden questions of the ethical principles relating to the sourcing, use, protection and ownership, as well
as  the  reliability  of  the  data  in  the datasets  on which algorithms learn,  [50] and the uses  to  which
different modes of AI are put  in different  contexts.  They are also highly  likely to differ  on far  more
fundamental values and in particular on the appropriate trade-offs between them, such as privacy and
security,  or  individual  rights  vs  those  of  the  collective,  trade-offs  which  become more  acute  when
deciding  how  to  manage  a  technology  which  provides  societal  benefits  but  also  the  potential  for
significant harm. We also know from long histories of regulating technologies (and of using technologies
as instruments of regulation) that apparently technical questions cannot and should not be separated
from questions relating to subjectivity, ethics or values. We may be comfortable with the outcome that
the  algorithms  of  Amazon  and  Netflix  can  produce  highly  differentiated  results  from  similar  data
sets, [51] but once AI  moves from the 'discretionary'  parts of our lives,  such as online purchasing of
consumer  goods,  to  the  core  elements  of  our  governance,  judicial  decision-making,  healthcare,
educational and welfare systems, then the values become increasingly contested, the trade-offs more
acute, and the stakes considerably higher.
To date, as noted, much of the discussion on AI has related to the role of goals and values, discussed in
the language of ethics. But identifying, and agreeing, goals and values is only one element of a regulatory
system:  essential,  but  by  no  means  sufficient.  Regulation  also  requires people  and  organisations to
change their behaviours - so understanding these second and third elements of any regulatory system is
critical  to understanding its dynamics and enhancing its effectiveness.  Regulation may be directed at
getting individuals to change their behaviours, frequently individuals as consumers. We need to have a
highly sophisticated understanding of how and why consumers behave as they do if they are to attempt
to  change  their  behaviours,  and  we  are  only  beginning  to  understand  behaviours  online,  their
relationship with offline behaviours, and how platform providers deliberately manipulate behaviours in
the way in which advertisers have tried to do for centuries, but in ways which data and AI now enable to
be  more  sophisticated  by  orders  of  magnitude.  In  contrast,  in  policy  making,  particularly  where
dominated by economists, the limitations of the rational actor model of consumer behaviour have been
assumed for far too long, and although inroads are being made through increased use of psychology and
behavioural  sciences, [52] that  model  remains  remarkably  tenacious  in  some  literatures  and  policy
discussions. Moreover, it is not only the behaviour of consumers which is of relevance, but of all involved
in regulatory systems. That would include in this case the designers of AI and, to the extent it exhibits
agency, of AI itself.
Further, regulatory systems are comprised of a series of organisational actors. These may be arranged
into more or less formal multi-level structures operating at the global, regional, national and/or sub-
national level, or into looser multi-lateral configurations, and/or they may compete, collaborate or simply
co-exist. [53] Financial regulation provides an interesting model. Following the financial crisis, the G20
created the Financial Stability Board, which sets principles of regulation which both G20 and non-G20
countries agree to implement through a cascading system of rules down to the regional and national
level.  There is  a system to monitor implementation and to review the impacts and effectiveness.  As
noted, various aspects of the debate on internet regulation and now that of and ML rightly focus on
organisational  design.  But  designing  and  creating  organisational  structures  is  not  enough.  Those
undertaking  any  regulatory  functions  require  the  necessary  capacities  and  associated  resources  to
undertake those functions,  both material  and human (funding,  expertise,  organisational  systems and
processes, the ability to learn), and social and political (power, authority, legitimacy), depending on the
functions they  are  exercising. [54] Those who are auditing  compliance require different  capacities  to
those who are setting the rules or imposing sanctions for their breach, for example. Organisational actors
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also need the motivation to use those capacities to further the orientated goals of the regulatory system,
which may not necessarily align with their own interests.  The 'well-intentioned, ill-informed' and 'ill-
intentioned,  well-informed'  regulatee  are  familiar  characters  in  the  compliance  literature,  for
example. [55] Furthermore, any regulatory system for AI will have to extend beyond national jurisdictions
or beyond anyone company, no matter how large. So international cooperation will be critical. But it is
likely that goals will be contested and interests and capacities misaligned - there is nothing unusual about
that. So understanding and anticipating the dynamics of the interactions of regulators is essential both to
analysing and to building and dynamically maintaining regulatory systems or networks.
Moreover,  interactions between organisational actors are critical  to understanding the dynamics of a
regulatory regime or network. Regulation is often a process in which one set of organisations (regulators)
act on another set of organisations (regulatees, or those they are regulating). The interactions between
regulators and regulatees, for example the debates about how to enforce rules, how to gain compliance,
are well researched. [56] But regulators, and others seeking to develop regulatory systems, also need to
focus on the context of those organisations they are regulating: what is the market structure, who are the
dominant players; what are their incentives; how does the market function? This includes but goes well
beyond the dominant platforms and into the far reaches of those developing and deploying AI, including
those in universities. We know that the internal governance and operation of those being regulated is
critical to the success or failure of regulation. [57] But we also need to focus on an area which is often
neglected, which is  on the internal  organisational  dynamics of regulators  themselves.  [58] Productive
interactions and unproductive dysfunctionalities can arise in all cases, as the long history of regulatory
failures, and regulatory successes, tells us. [59] And importantly, hybridity draws our attention to the fact
that large organisations can be at once regulatees, implementing standards imposed from elsewhere, and
regulators themselves - developing systems to motivate and ensure compliance with others' rules as well
as their own.
The fourth element of any regulatory system are the knowledge and understandings that regulators, and
others, have of what it is they are regulating. [60] This comprises not only technical knowledge, based on
particular epistemologies including what is seen to constitute valid knowledge, but system knowledge of
the  context  regulation  is  operating  in.  This  element  is  particularly  important  where  the  focus  of  a
regulatory regime is on managing risks. For example, it was largely due to failures to understand the
actual operation of the financial markets which led to the financial crisis. [61] We have argued above that
it has been the dominance of a particular way of 'seeing' and understanding the internet which has led to
'not seeing' the structural and systemic role which it plays, and therefore the risks that it  poses and
impacts that it  can have.  In the context of AI,  if  we are not to make the same mistakes,  then deep
engagement with those who are developing AI is essential. AI is, in significant part, a socially created
technical system of calculative models or devices [62] - understanding the key concepts which are being
deployed, the decision rules and selection criteria for what is included and what is excluded, and the
validation criteria are all critical to developing a sophisticated understanding of the technology. [63] But
we also need to understand the market and other contexts in which AI is being used and deployed. As the
history of telecoms and internet regulation above illustrates, it is the cognitive framing of the technology
and of the nature of the 'problem' it presents, combined with deep-rooted political philosophies on the
legitimate role of the state which can lead to failures to both see and accept the need for government-led
structural interventions.
How regulators perceive the world they operate in and the problems they have to address (and the
acceptability of any solutions they may devise) are thus key to the fifth element, which is the design and
operation of regulatory tools and techniques . It is this element which is usually where debates are most
focussed. When should regulation be applied: at the stage of entry of a technology (approval); and/or to
the manner of its use; and/or to providing compensation if it causes harm? What role can economic
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techniques (price controls, taxes) play in changing behaviours? When should regulation focus on market
structures and when is it sufficient to focus on firms' or consumers' behaviour? To what extent can we
rely on the parity of contracting power within a market to address the problems and when might we
need to regulate those contracts  to ensure collective values are upheld and/ or power asymmetries
addressed? When is it appropriate and possible to use 'nudge' techniques to change behaviour, or when
are rules required? If rules are required, what should be their legal status? What should be their form:
should regulators use standards, rules and/or principles and in what combination and in what contexts?
Can and should we use regulation by technology, including AI? What are the most effective ways of
gaining compliance? What sanctions should be imposed for breach and by whom? How and when should
regulation be evaluated, and, again, by whom?
All these are very familiar questions to anyone used to thinking about regulation.  [64] In considering how
to answer them in the case of AI, and more particularly the use of AI in different contexts, we can learn
from  regulatory  systems  which  have  preceded  it,  both  in  from  closely  related  areas  such
telecommunications  and  the  internet,  but  in  particular  from  other  areas  of  regulation  of  risk  and
technologies, including calculative technologies such as financial models, and ethically contested areas
such as genetic engineering in plants and humans. [65] In general, where risks fall on individuals and can
be compensated for, then regulation is comprised of ex post liability regimes (e.g. negligence, contract,
statutory regimes of product liability or food safety) which may or may not be supplemented by state or
non-state based oversight and enforcement. This is the 'develop, deploy, regulate' model noted above.
Where the risks  of  individual  harm are such that  it  is  considered a more precautionary approach is
required, then those making such products or delivering such services may be required to have specific
authorisation  (financial  services,  for  example)  (develop,  regulate,  deploy).  Where  the  risks  fall  on
individual but are non-compensatable or 'deep regret', such as threat to life, then there more onerous ex
ante requirements  are  imposed  through  licensing  and  ongoing  monitoring  and  enforcement,  and
standards of consent to be exposed to the risk are higher (such as licensing of pharmaceuticals and
consent  to  medical  treatment).  On  the  other  hand,  where  risks  are  systemic  even  though  still
compensatable, then systems which rely on individual consent to the risk are inadequate, and again  ex
ante regulation is required as well  as ex post remediation. Payment systems are a good example, and
indeed the argument above is that the internet should have been seen as posing such systemic risks.
Finally,  where  the  risks  are  systemic  and  the  harms  non-compensatable  or  non-remediatable,  then
regulatory regimes are ex ante and usually highly restrictive, with regulation of development imposed as
well  as deployment, requiring extensive trialling and close regulation:  such as the use of genetically
modified organisms, stem cell treatments, or in the case of aviation or nuclear power. We return to this
element below.
Finally, but most importantly, is the element of trust and legitimacy, and thus accountability. All regulators
need a political and a social licence to act, whoever they are. The need for trust and legitimacy is as
critical  for  a  company  operating  under  a  self-imposed  self-regulatory  regime  as  it  is  for  a  national
regulator or a transnational organisation imposing regulatory norms on others, including those which are
unlinked to governments such as IETF and W3C, and those acting as regulators need to work proactively
to create that legitimacy. regulatory system needs to be trusted and perceived as legitimate by a critical
number  of  legitimacy  communities  in  order  for  it  to  function,  even  if  it  is  not  universally  seen  as
legitimate.  These  include  those  who  are  relying  on  it  to  protect  or  support  them,  as  citizens  or
consumers, and those it is seeking to regulate. There are four core legitimacy and accountability demands
which are usually made by such legitimacy communities, in different combinations, and which we can see
echoed in the debates on internet regulation and now of AI: claims based on constitutional values (rule of
law, procedural fairness, accountability); claims based on normative values (attainment of justice, ethics,
sustainability and so forth); claims based on democratic values (dialogue, participation, representation,
European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol 10, Issue 3, 2019                          
accountability (again);  and claims based on functional  performance (such as  effectiveness,  expertise,
efficiency). But the demands of each group or legitimacy community can pull in different directions, so
maintaining  trust  and  legitimacy  is  an  ongoing  task  requiring  transparency  and  continual
engagement [66] and is particularly difficult in the context of managing risks.
This systems framework will not be attractive to those seeking set menus of solutions. It deliberately
breaks away from adopting a 'toolbox' approach to designing regulation and associated accountability
mechanisms which has been so prevalent for so long. Instead it provides a framework for enabling us to
think systematically about each part of any regulatory system. It is important to understand also that any
one system does  not  exist  in  isolation but  frequently  operates  in interaction with  other systems,  in
important  and  complex  ways.  Nevertheless  it  is  a  framework  for  designing  regulatory  systems,  for
understanding their  dynamics,  for analysing deep rooted causes of failures,  for  thinking through the
potential impacts of changes in any part of the system, and for helping us understand how each element
would need to operate and be accountable if regulation is to be both effective and trusted.
5. The Regulatory Action
It is too late for us to put AI and ML back into a box. It may be that in areas which are already heavily
regulated,  such  as  medical  products  and  applications,  then  the  use  of  AI  or  ML  will  require  prior
regulatory approvals. But even if they are caught in an existing regulatory net, there is little evidence that
regulators have the necessary capacity properly to evaluate all the actual and potential uses of AI in their
regulatory domains. Asymmetries of knowledge and skills are amplified in the highly technical area of AI.
And we can see from current debates in multiple areas that existing regulatory systems simply do not
capture the use of AI and ML, allowing them to operate on the edges of existing regulatory perimeters or
escape  them  entirely.  The  current  domination  by  corporate  players  means  that  AI  is  likely  to  be
developed and marketed in a similar fashion to internet products and online services. There will be both
a consumer market and a commercial market for products and services and in all likelihood they will be
regulated, if  at  all,  in piecemeal fashion. But as noted, AI is also being rapidly used by governments
themselves  to  deliver  welfare  provision  (education,  healthcare) [67] and  exercise  core  functions  of
government (policing, justice) and indeed in the function of regulation itself.  [68] Furthermore, we know
from the long histories of regulation in other areas that companies, government bodies, NGOs and others
will seek to reassure governments and consumers that formal regulation is not required; that they can
and  will  act  ethically  and  adopt  such  devices  as  codes  and  ethics  boards  to  demonstrate  that
commitment. However, we also know from history that a commitment to ethics is important, indeed
essential,  for  effective  regulation,  but  is  rarely  sufficient  on its  own in  the absence of  very  specific
conditions which rarely exist in a highly competitive market.
However, the current debate around AI ethics, fuelled by academics [69] has become the focus of both
governmental and intergovernmental discourse. The UK government has responded to nascent AI and ML
challenges  by  issuing  general  guidance  on  Understanding Artificial  Intelligence  Ethics  and
Safety [70] which  requires  anyone  in  the  public  sector  involved  in  the  design,  production,  and
deployment of an AI project to consider ethical considerations which arise at every stage of their project.
There  is  also  sector  specific  guidance  such  as  the Code of  conduct  for  data-driven health  and  care
technology issued at the same time [71] and which also employs an ethical  framework. The focus on
ethics is so strong that the new advisory body for AI in the UK, has ethics in its title. The Centre for Data
Ethics and Innovation was set up to "identify how we can enjoy to the full the potential benefits of data-
driven technology within  the ethical  and social  constraints  of  a  liberal  democratic  society." [72] At  a
European level the High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, which as an aside had four lawyers
and  seven  philosophers/ethicists,  also  focused  on  ethical  standards  over  legal/regulatory
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ones. [73] Although their trustworthy AI framework requires that AI should be lawful, this is simply a
requirement that it  "complies with all  applicable laws and regulations". [74] Thus lawful  AI  means AI
which meets the general requirements of law and regulation, there is no indication nor intent to suggest
specific  regulation for AI,  or indeed to amend those laws and regulations to accommodate the very
particular challenges AI poses.
If we are to seek to control the way corporates and governments use AI and ML, then ethics cannot
substitute  for  law  or  other  forms  of  formal  regulation.  Unlike  academic  proposals,  new  regulatory
regimes rarely land newly minted, in perfect form and onto a blank canvas: they are always situated in an
existing context often thick with existing norms and rules, with existing organisational structures, and
amongst actors with particular behaviours, cognitive frameworks, capacities and motivations. This paper
is at a minimum a call for lawyers, and for regulators more generally, to get involved in the debate and to
drive the discussion on from ethical frameworks to legal/regulatory frameworks and how they might be
designed, but it is also a call to recognise the dynamics and composition of any regulatory governance
system,  even  when  introducing  relatively  minor  changes,  let  alone  seeking  to  design  more  radical
approaches. It is also a call to adopt a more differentiated approach to the different types of risk that
different modalities or technologies of AI and ML can pose when developed and used by different actors
in different contexts, and to continually test our understandings of the risk/benefit trade-offs involved. As
the  financial  crisis  demonstrated,  if  we  build  our  regulatory  system on  the  basis  of  a  fundamental
misunderstanding of the dynamics of the system we are seeking to regulate, including its technologies,
the result can be disastrous.
It is not within the scope of this paper to design a new framework for regulating AI. However, we suggest
that whilst it is important that the overall regime for AI regulation is coherent, it does not need to, and
indeed should not, operate in isolation from existing regulatory regimes. Where an activity is already
regulated under a specific regulatory regime, then the use of AI in the development or deployment of
that activity, for example in the development of medical treatments or devices, is captured within the
perimeter of an existing regulatory regime. Those regulators need to develop norms for the use of AI, and
quickly,  but  the  mechanism  is  there.  In  areas  where  AI  is  being  used  where  there  is  currently  no
regulation or it falls at the edges of existing regimes, then we will have to rely on existing legal principles.
Reed, for  example, argues the application of general  legal  principles,  in particular human rights,  can
provide an interim framework for the general regulation of AI. But there are limits to the degree to which
general legal frameworks, such as the law of negligence, may adequately be used to manage risks or
attribute liability in ways which achieve overall societal goals. [75]
There are also risks that if we leave it to existing regimes to respond then we will end up not with a
coherent  system  but  with  patchwork  regulation  in  which  there  are  overlaps  and  underlaps,  with
conflicting goals and logics. Moreover, enforcement systems which rely on individuals to bring cases to
court  can  be  less  effective  than  public  enforcement  systems  for  very  well  documented
reasons. [76] Coordination both in design and operation is required.  However,  we do not need to do
nothing  whilst  new  integrated  systems  are  being  developed.  Furthermore,  using  the  quite  familiar
framework of risk regulation outlined above to analyse what types of risk particular uses of AI is posing in
which contexts  could  be a highly  productive  way to  begin to  develop regulatory  regimes  which are
appropriately tailored to its use.
In his recent article, Reed in effect takes this risk-based approach to explore how liability for decisions
made using AI could or should be attributed, at least as an interim measure whilst more tailored regimes
are developed. He proposes that liability should be attributed using principles of transparency about the
reasoning  method  being  used.  However,  as  he  notes,  we  need  to  distinguish  between ex
ante transparency, where the decision-making process can be explained in advance of the AI being used,
and ex  post transparency,  'where  the  decision-making  process  is  not  known in  advance  but  can  be
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discovered retrospectively by testing the AI's performance in the same circumstances. Any law mandating
transparency needs to make it clear which kind of transparency is required. [77] Importantly, only some
algorithmic methods lend themselves to ex ante transparency, notably those relying on decision trees.
Here the reasoning can be set out in advance. However, in the case of other algorithmic technologies,
such as neural networks, the machine is learning as it processes the data and it is not possible to set out
the  reasoning  in  advance.  It  is  also  not  possible,  or  at  least  not  easy,  to  explain  the  reasoning ex
post. [78] Requiring ex ante transparency would in effect prohibit the use of that particular technology,
even  where  it  may  produce  a  superior  result.  Nonetheless  it  is  possible  to  test  neural  network
technologies,  for  example,  for  reliability  and replicability,  and to  examine the process  by  which the
particular  algorithm was  developed including the data sets,  training methods and testing  processes.
Either no transparency or e x post transparency should be sufficient, he argues where the harm falls on
individuals and is compensatable (e.g. autonomous vehicles). However, where there is no clear societal
benefit and harms are systemic and non-compensatable, such as breaches of human rights, then only
systems  in  which ex  ante transparency  is  possible  should  be  permitted. [79] Furthermore,  simply
demanding  transparency  is  likely  to  be  effective  without  considering  who  the  information  is  being
conveyed to, and their ability to understand it. [80] Numerous examples exist of disclosure requirements
which end up baffling consumers as they prioritise comprehensiveness over comprehensibility.
This structured way of using a risk/benefit calculus for analysing what form of transparency should be
required takes us into the very familiar territory, for regulationists, of the risk-based regulation of new
technologies,  outlined  above.  It  thus  helps  take  us  towards  a  more  systematic  development  of  a
regulatory regime for AI and ML. We can see steps being taken in this direction within the EU with
respect to data. Already under the General Data Protection Regulation [81] data controllers are required
to  process  data  in  a  transparent  manner  and  to  give  an  explanation  of  processes  used  in  data
profiling. [82] With respect to AI, as a first step annual transparency reports from AI developers could
prove  this  interim  solution  until  more  formal  regulation  is  developed.  This  is  in  line  with  the
recommendation from the Communications and Digital  Committee of  the House of  Lords that "data
controllers  and  data  processors  should  be  required  to  publish  an  annual  data  transparency
statement" [83] and to the recent  consultation of  the UK Information Commissioner  on guidance on
explaining AI based decisions. [84]
But transparency can only go part of the way; we need a more robust, holistic and coherent system for
regulating the development and use of AI and ML. How we design, create, and operate those regulatory
systems will be critical. If we allow the regulation and governance models for AI to drift for the next 5-10
years, as happened with the internet between 1995-2010, we will find ourselves in the same position in
20 years' time with respect to AI as we do now with regard to online content and activity: at the mercy of
a small number of companies who regulate the market and activity through private contractual ordering
and (mostly) outside the direct control and influence of public regulators including states.
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